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Previewscompelling case for using their experi-
mental system to pursue these questions.
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A report by Payzan-LeNestour et al. (2013) in this issue of Neuron shows that the human locus coeruleus, a
brain stem nucleus containing cell bodies of noradrenergic neurons, dynamically tracks the level of uncer-
tainty about knowledge of the environment while making decisions.Our forecasts about the consequences
of our decisions are often uncertain. In
many instances, this uncertainty cannot
be eliminated. A typical example is the
weather forecast, where our mathemat-
ical models are inherently inaccurate.
Nevertheless, because we know how
bad our models are, we can adequately
adapt and take sensible decisions by
embracing this form of uncertainty. Such
known, or ‘‘expected,’’ uncertainties
shape our beliefs about the regularities
in our natural and social environment.
A more challenging scenario occurs
when rules in our environment unexpect-
edly change. One daunting source for
such unexpected uncertainty is global
climate change. It is clear that at some
unpredictable and hence unexpected
time in the not-so-distant future our cur-
rent models will become quite inadequate
and our forecasts more uncertain thanthey are now. When this occurs, we will
need to rapidly recognize this state of
increased uncertainty and learn new
models that allow more reliable predic-
tions. It is intuitively evident that the chal-
lenge for our brain is remarkable; it needs
to distinguish whether the uncertainty is
caused because our environment has
changed or because we have not yet
obtained enough samples (or observa-
tions) in an otherwise stable environment.
We don’t need to exhaust examples of
natural disaster to understand that being
able to rapidly adapt to ‘‘unknown un-
knowns‘‘ or ‘‘unexpected uncertainties’’
is a key cognitive feat which expands to
all aspects of decision making given the
dynamic environment in which we live. A
simple example from economic decision
making is depicted in Figure 1.
Despite its ubiquitous importance, we
know surprisingly little about how the hu-man brain computes unexpected uncer-
tainty and which brain mechanisms are
recruited to adapt to it. In this issue of
Neuron, Payzan-LeNestour et al. (2013)
have now taken a big leap to close this
gap combining a formal treatment of the
different sources of uncertainty (also see
Yu and Dayan, 2005) with fMRI. As de-
picted in Figure 1, expected uncertainty
(or risk) is the irreducible entropy in the
outcome probabilities of a given option.
Another source of uncertainty is estima-
tion uncertainty (or ambiguity) which re-
sults from the lack of knowledge about
the outcome probabilities, e.g., when the
options have not been sampled enough.
Finally, unexpected uncertainty results
from sudden changes in the outcome
probabilities, which calls for a reset in
the learning process. Whereas previous
neuroimaging studies have delineated
the neuronal circuits involved in trackingron 79, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 9
Figure 1. Sources of Uncertainty in Decision Making
While taking decisions in a dynamically changing environment, three different sources of uncertainty can
occur: expected uncertainty (or risk), estimation uncertainty (or ambiguity), and unexpected uncertainty.
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Previewsand representing risk and ambiguity (see
(Bach and Dolan [2012] for a review), no
previous human fMRI experiments have
studied the neuronal correlates of unex-
pected uncertainty as such and indepen-
dently from other forms of uncertainty.
Payzan-LeNestour et al. (2013) used a
restless bandit task. In this task, partici-
pants chose between two options drawn
from a pool of six options with different
probability of delivering a monetary win,
a monetary loss, or a null outcome. These
outcome probabilities were not stationary
and were changed discretely without
previous warning generating unexpected
uncertainty. Options belonged to two
different groups with different rate of
outcome probability change (fast and
slow). Within each group there were three
different levels of risk or expected uncer-
tainty (high, medium, low) as defined by
the entropy of the outcome probabilities.
One feature that facilitated the search for
a hypothesized unexpected uncertainty
signal in the noradrenergic system (Yu
and Dayan, 2005) was the ability to decor-
relate expected and unexpected uncer-
tainty. As risk is closely associated with
expected value and the dopaminergic
system (Schultz, 2010), it is crucial to
decorrelate the two sources of uncer-
tainty to study the specific involvement
of noradrenergic system.10 Neuron 79, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier ITo model participant’s behavior and
generate regressors to interrogate brain
data, the authors used a Bayesian model
that independently tracked expected un-
certainty, estimation uncertainty, and un-
expected uncertainty (Payzan-LeNestour
and Bossaerts, 2011). Within the model,
decisions were made by comparing the
expected value of the offered options,
which were estimated with knowledge of
their expected uncertainty. On each trial,
the model updated the posterior distribu-
tion on outcome probabilities by taking
into account the estimates of estimation
and unexpected uncertainty. Intuitively,
when an unexpected outcome is realized
one needs to consider whether this is
because estimation uncertainty is high
and learning of expected uncertainty
needs to continue, or because the unex-
pected uncertainty has risen as a result
of a change in contingencies. In the for-
mer case learning needs to proceed
without resetting and learning rate should
decrease, in the latter a reset is required
and learning rate should increase to
outweigh past experiences. Increased
learning rates had previously been ob-
served as a result of increased volatility
(Behrens et al., 2007). In that study, vola-
tility referred to the rate of change of the
contingencies in the environment, a notion
closely related to unexpected uncertainty.nc.However, unexpected uncertainty was
not separately modeled from estimation
uncertainty. Interestingly, estimation un-
certainty in the study by Payzan-LeNes-
tour was tracked in the anterior cingulate
cortex, a region previously found to track
volatility (Behrens et al., 2007).
Yet the main achievement of Payzan-
LeNestour et al. (2013) was their compre-
hensive brain imaging approach which
not only assessed the cortical networks
involved in signaling uncertainty but also
the pontine brainstem with the norad-
renergic locus coeruleus (LC). The LC is a
tube-shaped nucleus located in the rostral
pontine brainstem and begins rostrally
within the ventrolateral central gray sub-
stance, at the level of the inferior colliculus,
and extends caudally to a position in the
lateral wall of the fourth ventricle. Impor-
tantly, the LC constitutes the sole source
of noradrenergic innervation of neocortex
and hippocampus (Sara, 2009).
The challenge of imaging the LC (also
see Astafiev et al., 2010) is that it is a
small structure spanning a distance of
roughly 16 to 17 mm (decreasing to
13 mm in an 104 year old individual)
(German et al., 1988). The total unilateral
area of the LC proper, which contains
the somata of LC neurons ranges from
32.8 to 17.2 mm2 (64-year-old individual
to 104-year-old individual). Imaging such
a small structure should ideally be con-
ducted with a functional resolution of
less than 1 mm 3 1 mm 3 1 mm. How-
ever, aside from the fact that such
a high-resolution is a rare exception
achieved by a few ultrahigh field MR
scanning sites, an important anatomical
and functional feature of the LC suggests
that lower imaging resolution should be
sufficient. This feature is that the LC
proper is surrounded by a shell of LC
neuron dendrites termed the pericerulear
zone (Aston-Jones et al., 2004). The size
of the pericerulear dendritic zone is
around 500 mm in rats and probably of
similar size in humans. Thus, taking the
LC proper and its pericerulear zone
together, the functional resolution used
in the study of Payzan-LeNestour et al.
(2013) should be just sufficient to be
able to attribute activity specifically to LC.
More importantly, Payzan-LeNestour
et al. (2013) have made an excellent effort
to improve the spatial alignment of
the pontine brain stem across their
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Previewsparticipants. This involved manual seg-
mentation of individual participants’ brain
stems together with an iterative spatial
alignment procedure. They also usedmin-
imal spatial smoothing in order to improve
spatial specificity. This way, they ensured
as much as possible that the observed
fMRI response in the LC is not the re-
sult of misattributing neighboring activity
to the LC. As a result of this, they
observed a very impressive correspon-
dence between the fMRI signal to unex-
pected uncertainty and the expected
location of the LC.
Aside from the challenges of spatial
scale, fMRI imaging of the LC is also chal-
lenged by the anatomical and functional
complexity of this region. The pericerulear
zone is rich in GABAergic neurons which
project to the LC neurons probably
providing inhibition for the LC noradren-
ergic system (Aston-Jones et al., 2004).
Themedial prefrontal cortex, dorsomedial
hypothalamus, medial preoptic area, dor-
sal raphe, and central amygdala all influ-
ence LC activity and project densely to
the medial peri-LC region but relatively lit-
tle to the LC nucleus proper (Aston-Jones
et al., 2004). To make things more comp-
licated there are additional inputs to the
LC from other regions some of them
supplying dopaminergic (SN/VTA) and
cholinergic (pedunculopontine tegmental
nucleus and the laterodorsal tegmentum)
neuromodulatory influences (for a review
see (Samuels and Szabadi, 2008).
Hence, given all these complexities of
neurotransmitter control over LC function
and its connectivity, it is clear that fMRI
signal changes observed in the LC cannot
be easily interpreted. The authors did,
however, make an effort to model fast
and slowly changing (‘‘phasic’’ and
‘‘tonic’’) patterns of LC activity. Whether
these patterns relate to the physiology of
phasic and tonic firing of LC neurons re-
mains unclear, of course. However, what
is remarkable in the present work is that
LCactivity is specificallymodulated by un-
expected uncertainty. This specific rela-
tionship was predicted by computational
modeling (Yu and Dayan, 2005) and
behavioral evidence from pupillometry
studies (Preuschoff et al., 2011). This fasci-
nating convergence of theory and physi-
ology paves the road for future studies.
There are a number emerging ques-
tions which the current study encouragesus to tackle. Wewould like to highlight just
two here. The first relates to the exciting
possibility to image functional activity in
the SN/VTA and LC simultaneously and
thus observe the interaction of both re-
gions during decision making. The sec-
ond relates to the role of the hippocampus
in coping with unexpected uncertainty.
As careful but nevertheless inquisitive
creatures we balance between drives to
exploit what we know and explore the
unknown. In so-called ‘‘model-free’’ rein-
forcement learning, recent reward out-
comes are integrated into action-value as-
sociations and exploration is undirected
(Sutton and Barto, 1998). But the explora-
tion/exploitation dilemma can also be ap-
proached from a Bayesian perspective.
Decision making in dynamically changing
environment improves if the statistics of
the environment (model of the world) are
tracked to assess the salience of new in-
formation and the beliefs about action
values are updated accordingly. In such a
model-based framework, uncertainty
should promote exploration, as supported
by some studies (e.g., Badre et al., 2012).
On the other hand, human participants
tend to avoid uncertain options when
ambiguity is high (reviewed by Bach and
Dolan, 2012).
There are probably different computa-
tional mechanisms that bias the balance
toward exploration: one mechanism
detects the lack of knowledge in the
face of unexpected uncertainty while
another mechanism assigns a ‘‘bonus’’
for potential reward to the detected
uncertain option or environment, thus fa-
voring their sampling. An intriguing possi-
bility is that these two computational
processes depend on two distinct neuro-
modulatory systems: the noradrenergic
system detecting uncertainty and the
dopaminergic system assigning bonuses
to the uncertain options. The current
advances of fMRI now allow us to investi-
gate such hypotheses pertaining to the
interaction of the LC and SN/VTA.
One remarkable finding is the involve-
ment of the hippocampus in tracking
unexpected uncertainty related to reward
outcomes. Beyond its association to
memory and spatial navigation, the hip-
pocampus, especially its anterior portion,
is also related to what is generally known
as anxiety response (Fanselow and
Dong, 2010). The anxiety response entailsNeurobehavioral inhibition and other behavioral
adjustments in response to a conflict
between approach and avoidance ten-
dencies. Thus, an interesting avenue for
future research would be to disentangle
whether the hippocampus specifically
tracks unexpected uncertainty or it has
instead a more general role in generating
adaptive behavioral responses to conflict-
ing behavioral tendencies such as the
ones observed when unexpected uncer-
tainty is high.
Thus far, research on the function of
the LC has remained a realm for animal
studies and computational models. In
contrast, evidence for its implication in
decision-making in humans has been
lacking. Thanks to the work of Payzan-
LeNestour et al. (2013), we do not need
tobe souncertain at last that theLCmakes
a quite specific contribution to human
decision making.
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